International Trade and Income Distribution: A Reconsideration by Paul R. Krugman
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES








The research reported here is part of the NBER'sresearch
program in International Studies. Any opinions expressed
are those of the author and not those of the National
Bureau of Economic Research.NBER Working Paper 356
June 1979
International Trade and Income Distribution:
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SUMMARY
The postwar expansion of trade among the industrial countries has not
had the strong distributional effects which standard models of trade would
have led us to expect. This paper develops a model which attempts to explain
this observation, while at the same time making sense of some other puzzling
empirical aspects of world trade.
The basis of the model is a distinction between two kinds of trade:
"Heckscher—Ohlin" trade, based on differences in factor proportions, and
"intraindustry" trade, based on scale economies and product differentiation.
To incorporate intraindustry trade into the model it is necessary to drop the
usual assumptions of constant returns to scale and perfect competition;
instead the paper deals with a world where economies of scale are pervasive
and all firms possess some monopoly power. Surprisingly, it is nonetheless
possible to develop a fully—worked—out general equilibrium model which remains
simple and can be used to compare autarky and free trade.
Two main results emerge from the analysis. First, the nature of trade
depends on how similar countries are in their factor endowments. As countries
become more similar, the trade between them will increasingly become intra—
industry in character. Second, the effects of opening trade depend on its
type. If intraindustry trade is sufficiently dominant the advantages of
extending the market will outweigh the distributional effects, and the owners
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In principle, free trade can make everyone better off; but received theory,
from Stolper and Samuelson (1941) to Jones (1971), suggests that this is unlikely
to happen in practice. The changes in relative goods prices that come with ex-
panded trade produce changes in the distribution of income; and in the simple
models which make up the core of trade theory these changes in income distribution
invariably -leave the owners of some factors of production absolutely worse off.
The implication is that trade liberalization always involves trading off gains
for some against losses for others, suggesting that moves toward freer trade will
occur only rarely and after severe political struggles.
If one looks at the historical record, however, especially in the post-
war period, it begins to appear as if this is one of those unusual cases in
which theory has been too pessimistic about the consequences of laissez—faire.
The last thirty years have been marked by a great increase in trade, especially
among the industrial countries, with very few problems of adjustment. Only in
recent years, with the growth of imports from the newly industrializing coun-
tries, have the pressures for protection again became strong. This experience
of painlessgrowth intrade is in itself a major riddle, but it is wrapped in
thelargerenigma of the pattern of trade. Standard theory predicts trade
between countries with different factor endowments, with countries specializing
in goods with different factor intensities. Yet the growth in trade. has largely
been among the industrial countries, which appear to be fairly similar in factor
• endowment and surely have become more similar over time •Andthe trade among
these countries is largely, and increasingly, two—way trade in similar products.
Thus there are three great paradoxes of international trade: who trades with
whom, what they trade in, and why it hurts so little.2
Thepurpose of this paper is to provide a tentative explanation of these
paradoxes, one which gives some guide to identifying situations in which expan-
sion of trade will andwillnot pose serious problems of income distribution.
The explanation is not a new one: it is essentially the same as that put f or—
ward by Balassa (1967), Grubel (1970), and Kravis (1971), among others. What
this paper does is put the argument in terms of a formal model, a step which
may be of some help in clarifying anddisseminatingideas which have been "in
theair"forsome time.
Briefly, the argument runs as follows. There are two kinds of trade:
Heckscher—Ohlin trade, which is based on differences infactor proportions,
and "intraindustry"trade, which is based on the interaction of economies of
scalewith product differentiation. Countries with similar factor endowments
will have little incentive for engaging in Heckscher—Olin trade, but will still
engage in intraindustry trade. But intraindustry trade does not have the strong
distributional effects of Heckscher—Ohlin trade. The result is that expansion
of trade between countries with sufficiently similar factor endowments will not
pose the distributional problems which Heckscher—Ohlin theory leads us to expect.
Obviously, the crucial step in formalizing this argument is to model in—
traindustry trade. In this paper I use a simple model of intraindustry trade
whichwasdevelopedin anearlier paper (Krugman 1979), and extendit to a two—
industry, two—factor world. The structure of this model andthe determination of
thismodel's equilibrium in a closed economy is set forth in Section 1. Section
2shows howthepattern of trade between twocountriesis determined in the model,
developingthe basic relationship between differences in factor endowments and
the extent of intraindustry trade. Section 3 then examines the effects of trade
on income distribution, and shows how the extent of intraindustry trade deter-
mines whether scarce factors of production gain or lose from trade. Finally,3
Section4 summarizes the results and discusses someimplicationsfor theory
and policy.
It must be phasized that the model presented here is in no sense a
general one. In addition to making strong assumptions about functional forms
ofcost and utilityfunctions, I impose a great deal,ofsymmetry on the model
to simplify the analysis and give a natural meaning to the concept of "similar-
ity" in factor proportions. Thus the results of the analysis are at best
suggestive. Nonetheless, they se intuitively plausible, and also se to
have something to do with actual experience.
-
1.The Model in a Closed Economy
Intraindustry trade depends on the existence of unexhausted economies
of scale in production. The mainprobln in modelling this kind of trade is
howto handle these scale economies, which must lead to a breakdown of perfect
competition (unless they are wholly external to firms). In this paper, as in
an earlier paper(Krugman 1979),I will use thedevice ofChamberlinian mono-
polistic competition,basing the model on recent work by Dixit and Stig],itz (1977).
An "inzustry" will consist of a large number of firms, all producing somewhat
differentiated products, all operating on the downward—sloping parts of their
average cost curves. There will be two—way international trade within an in-
dustry, because firms in different countries will produce different differen-
tiated products. What prevents countries from producing a complete range of
products domestically is the existence of fixed costs in production; thus scale
economies are the basic cause of intraindustry trade.
Let us begin, however, with a two—industry model of a closed economy.
All of the products in each industry will enter symmetrically into demand, with
the two industries—industry 1 and industry 2—themselves playing symmetric
roles. Al]. individuals will have the convenient utility function4
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where C11isconsumption of the i product of industry 1; C2jiscon-
sumption of the th product of industry 2; and n1, n2 are the number of
products actually produced in each industry. The utility function (1) has
several useful properties. First, it ensures that half of income will always
be spent on industry l's products, half on industry 2's products. Second, if
the number of products in each industry is large, it implies that every pro-
ducer faces a demandcurvewith elasticity l/l_e. Finally, (1) will allow
us to represent the gains and losses from trade in a particularly simple way.
On the demand side, then, an industry is assumed to consist of a number
of products which are imperfect substitutes for one another. On the supply
side, however, they will be assumed to be perfect substitutes. There will be
only two factors of production, type 1 labor and type 2 labor, each of which
is wholly specific to an industry but nonspecific among products within an
industry. Thus type 1 labor will be used only in industry 1, type 2 only in
industry 2. Within each industry the labor required to produce a particular







where £ ,islabor used in producing the i product of industry 1; x1
,
isthe output of that product; and so on. To go from these required labor
inputs to nominal costs we must multiply by the wage rates of the two types
of labor, w1 and w2.5
To close the model, we begin by noting that output of each product, x,
isthe sumofindividual consumptions of the product. At the same time,total
employmentin each industry is the sum of employment in producing allthein-
dividual products.Assuming full employment, we have
ni




Thus the total labor force is set equal to 2, with the parameter z measuring
factor proportions. As we will see below,z willassume crucial significance
in determining the importance of intraindustry trade and the effect of trade on
income distribution.
Weare nowpreparedto examine the determinationof equilibrium in this
model.This involves determining howmanyproducts are actually produced in
each industry, the output of each product, the prices of products, and the
relativewages of the two kinds of labor. We should note at the outset that
itis indeterminate which products are produced——but itis also unimportant.
Our firststep is todetermine the pricing policy of firms. We assume
that producers can always costlessly differentiate their products. This means
that each product will be produced by only one firm. If there are many products
the elasticity of demandforeach product will, as already noted, be l/l—e.
(This is proved in the Appendix). Thus each firm will face a demandcurve of
constantelasticity. We then have the familiar result that the profit—maximizing






where p1, p2 are the prices of any products in industry 1 and 2 respectively
which are actually produced.
Given the pricing policy of firms, actual profits depend on sales:
'1 —p1x1
—(a+ x1)v1 (5)
— — (a+ 8 x2)w2
where x1, x2 are sales of representative firms in the two industries.
But in this model there will be free entry of firms, driving each in-
dustry to Chamberlin's "tangency solution" where profits are zero. Thus we
can use the condition of zero profits in equilibrium to determine the equilib-
rium size and number of firms. Setting 'r — — 0,and using (4) and (5),
we have
a 0 x —x _._ (6) 1 2 1—0




Thefinal step in determining equilibrium is to determine relative wages.
This can bedone very simply by noting that the industries receive equal shares
of expenditure, and that since profits are zero in equilibrium these receipts
go entirely to the wages of the industry—specific labor forces. So w1L1
w2L2, implying
w1/w2 —z/(2—z) (8)7
We now have a completely worked—out equilibrium for a two—sector, mono—
polistically competitive economy. It is indeterminate which of the range of
potential. products within each industry are actually produced, but since all
products appear symmetrically, this is of no welfare significance. The character
ofthe economy is determined by the twoparameters z and0.The value of z
determinesrelative wages: if z is low, type 2 labor will receive much higher
wages than type 1 labor. The value of 0 measures the degree of substituta-
bility among products within an industry.It is also, in equilibrium, a measure
ofthe importance of scale economies. From (4) we have 0
8w1/p18w2/p2.
But 8w1, 8w2 are the marginal Costs of production, while in equilibrium price
equals average cost. Thus 0 is the ratio of marginal to average cost (which
is also the elasticity of cost with respect to output).
2. Factor Proportions and the Pattern of Trade
Inthe last section we saw how equilibriumcanbe determined ina simple
closed—economymodel with scale economies and differentiated products. We can
now examine what happens when two such economies trade. What we are principally
concerned with is the proposition, advanced in the introduction, that countries
with similar factor endowments will engage in tintraindustry trade, while
countries with very different endowments will engage in Beckscher-Ohlin trade.
As a first step we need a working measure of the extent of intraindustry
trade.The empirical literature onintraindustry trade (e.g., Hufbauer and
Chilas 1974, Grubei. and Lloyd 1975) generally concentrates on an index oftrade
overlap, i.e.,
zlx-MI k kk i—i— (9)8
whereX is a country's exports in industry k, Mk is imports in that in-
dustry. This index hastheproperty that if trade is balanced industry by
industry,it equals one, while if there is complete international specializa-
tion, so that every industry is either an export or import industry, itequals
zero.As we willsee, this index fits in quite well with the model of this
paper.
Theother concept we need to tie down is that of "similarity" in factor
endowments.In general this is not welldefined.WhatI will do in this paper,
however, is to consider a special case in which the concept does have a natural
meaning, without trying to arrive at a general definition.
Let us suppose, then, that there are twocountries,the home country
andtheforeign country. The home country will be just as described in Section
1. The foreign country will be identical, except for one thing: the relative
sizes of the two industries' labor forces will be reversed. That is1' the
foreign country willbe a mirror image of the home country. Ifwe use a star




Obviously, given this pattern of endowments we can regard z as an
index of similarity in factor proportions. If z —1,the countries have iden-
tical endowments. As z gets smaller, the factor proportions become increas-
ingly different.
Nowsupposethese countries are able to trade, at zero transportation
cost. As before, we candeterminepricing behavior, the size andnumberof
firms,and relativewages. Inaddition, we can determinethe volume ofpattern
oftrade.9
Thefirst point to note is that the elasticity of demandforany par-
ticular product is still 1/1—0. This gives us price equations exactly the
sane as before:






Now, however, the symmetry of the setup insures that allwageswill be
equal, both across industries andinternationally:
w1"w.w2'w (12)
The zero—profit condition will determine the equilibritun size of firm,
x, which will be the same for both industries in both countries:
x— ae/5(1—0) (13)
Finally, full—employment determines the number of firms in each industry
in each country:
—'4 — (2—z)/(cz+Bx) (14)
—'4
Whatthese results show is that trade will lead to factor price equali-
zation, while leaving the pattern of production unchanged. Ourremainingtask
is to determine the volume andpatternof trade. We candothis by noting two
points. First, everyone will devote equal shares of expenditure to the two
industries. Second, everyone will spend an equal amount on eachofthe products10
within an industry. This meansthatthe share of all individuals' income
falling on,say, industry1 products produced in the foreign country is
*
1.• ——thatis, the industry share in expenditure times that country's
ni-I-n1
share of the industry. But the number of products is proportional to the
labor force. Thus if we let Y be the home country's income, (equal to the
foreign country's), X1 be exports of industry 1 products,X2 be exports of
industry 2 products, M1 be imports of industry 1 products, andM2 be imports






Nowtherelations (15) have two importantimplications. First, consider
thevolume of trade, Total home country exports areX1 +X24Y.Thus
the ratio of trade to income is independent of z, the index ofsimilarity in
factor proportions. This can be regarded as an answer to the firstempirical
paradox mentioned in the introduction, the large volume of tradeamong similar
countries. In this modelsimilarcountries will trade just as much as dissimilar
countries.
The second empirical paradox was the prevalence, in tradeamong similar
countries, of two—way trade in similar products. If we substitute (15) into
our expression for intraindustry trade (9), we get a simple, striking result:
I—z (16)11
The indexof intraindustrytradeequalsthe index of similarityin factor
propprtions.
This still leaves us with the third empirical paradox, which was that
expansion of trade, when it involves largely intraindustry trade, seems to in-
volve few problems of income distribution. To see how this can be understood
is the task of the next section.
3.Gains andLosses from Trade
In this section we must again begin by tying down a concept which I
have been using loosely. This is the idea of the "seriousness" of distribution
problems. What we need is a clear way of formulating the notion that distri-
bution problems from opening trade will not be serious ifcountriesare suf-
ficientlysimilar in factor proportions, so that the trade which results is
primarily intraindustry trade.
The criterion I will use to define nonserious distribution problems is
the following: distribution problems arising from trade will be held not to
beserious ifboth factors from trade. This of course begs some questions,
sincethere may be difficulties in getting groups to accept a relative decline
in income even if they are absolutely better off. But this criterion is fairly
reasonable, and turns out to give suggestive results.
To find out whether factors gain from trade, we need to know how utility
depends on the variables of the model.Supposean individual receives a wage
w,and has theutility function (1). He will then spend vIZ on the products
ofeachindustry,and divide his expenditure equally emong the products within
an industry. Thus his utility will depend on his wage, the prices of represen-
tative products in each industry, andthenmber of products available:12
—
Ln{n1(W12n1P1)0]lIe+ Ln[u2(W/2n2P2)e]1/e (17)
—— 2Ln2 + Lu v/p1 + Lu u/p2
1—6 1—0 + Lu u1 + Lu
The function (17) has the convenient property that all the effects enter
additively. Utility depends on real wages intermsofrepresentative products
andon diversity.
To analyze the effects of trade on welfare, it is useful to introduce
some morenotation.
--
U1,U2 utility of workers in industry 1, 2
vii, w12 —realwage of industry 1 workers in terms of products of
industries 1 and 2
w21, w22realwageof industry2workers in terms of products of
industries 1 and2
Then we can substitute into (17) to get (suppressing the constant term)




-Luw21 + Lu w22 + Lu n1 + Lu n2
We are now in a position to measure the welfare effects of trade. Sup-
pose we start from a position of autarky, as in Section 1, then move to free
trade, as in Section 2. There will then be two kinds of effects. First, there
willbe a "Stolper—Samuelson" effect as factor prices are equalized. As one
caneasilyverify, labor's realwageremains the same in terms of the products13
of its own industry, while rising or falling in terms of the other industry's
products depending on whether the factor is abundant or scarce. Thus in the
homecountrythis effect benefits labor in industry 1, hurts labor in industry
2.
Thesecond effect comes from the increase in the size of the market,
whichmakes a greater variety of products available. This works to everyone's
benefit.
Sinceboth effects work in its favor, the abundant factor must be made
better off. This leaves us withthe problem of determining the change in
utility of the scarce factor—industry 2 laborin the homecountry, and the
symmetrically placed industry 1 labor in the foreign country.
Let a prime onavariable indicate its free trade value, while unmarked
variables refer to autarky. Then as we move from the autarky solution in





' 1—0 + Lun1/u1 +——
Lu
—Luz/2—z + Ln 2/2—z
+ Lu2/z
where the first term is negative, andrepresentsthe Stolper—Samuelson distri-
bution loss;and the remaining terms are positive, and represent the gains
from being part of a larger market. The question is under what conditions
these terms will outweigh the first term.
Bycollecting terms, we canrewrite (19) as14
U2 —U2
— Lnz —Lu2—z + Ln 2 (20)
This gives us one immediate result: if 8< 0.5, the scarce factor
necessarily gains from trade, since the first term will be positive and the
third term will outweigh the second. Recall that 0 is, in equilibrium, the
ratio of marginal to average cost, and can thus be regarded as an index of the
importance of economies of scale. What this result then says is that if scale
economies are sufficien important, both factors gain from trade.
If 0> 0.5, whether both factors gain depends on the extent to which
trade is intraindustry in character, which in turn depends on how similar the
countries are in factor proportions. When 0> 0.5, the function (20) has three
2—20
properties: (i) as z approaches 1, U2 —U2goes to Lu 2 >0;
(ii) as z goes to zero, U2 —U2goes to minus infinity;
(iii) U2 —U2is strictly increasing in z1.
Thus if we were to graph (20), it would look like Figure 1. There is a critical
value of z, ,forwhich U; —U2
—0.If z > both factors gain; if
z <zthe scarce factor loses. But z is our measure of similarity in factor
proportions. Thus what we have shown is that if countries have sufficientljr
similar factor endowments, both factors gain from trade.
What is particularly nice about this result is that we have already seen
that there is a one—for—one relationship between similarity of factor endowments
and intraindustry trade. So this result can be taken as a vindication of the
arguments of such authors as Kravis (1971) and Hufbauer and Chilas (1974) that
intraindustrytrade poses fewer adjustment problems than Heckscher-Ohlin trade.
We should note, however, that the critical value of intraindustry trade
depends on theimportance of scale economies. The function (20) is decreasing
in8: —
U2)/30
—0Lu z(2—z) <0. Soanincrease in 0 will shift the














important are scale econom4,themore similar countries must be if both
factors are to gain from trade.






Inthe limit, as 0 goes to 1, so does .Whatthis says is that a
world in whichscaleeconomies are unimportant is a Heckscher-Ohlin world to
which the Stolper—Satnuelson theorem applies. But in this model this is only a
limiting case.
4. Summaryand Conclusions
Thispaper began with three "paradoxes" about international trade.
Since they do not seem so paradoxical in the light of this model, perhaps we
should state them as "stylized facts":
(i) Much of world trade is between countries with similar factor endowments;
(ii)Thetrade between similar countries is largely "intraindustry" in charac-
ter, i.e.,it consists of two-way trade in similar products;
(iii) The growth of intraindustry trade has not posed serious income distribu-
tionproblems.
The modeldevelopedinthis paper, which combines factor proportions
theorywith what is sometimes called "scale economies with differentiated prod-
ucts" theory, provides a simple—perhaps too simple—explanation of these styl-
ized facts. In this model, countries with similar factor proportions will
trade just as much as countries with dissimilar factor proportions. Intrain—
dustry trade and similarity of factor proportions are directly related. And18
trade between sufficiently similar countries will benefit scarce as well as
abundant factors.
In addition to helping make sense of some puzzling empirical results,
this paper is, I hope, of some interest from the standpoint of pure theory.
The model dispenses with the two most fundamental assumptions of standard
trade theory: perfect competition and constant returns to scale. Instead,
I have dealt in this paper with a world in which economies of scale are perva-
sive andallfirms have monopoly power. While the model depends on extremely
restrictiveassumptions, it does show that it is possible for trade theory to
makeatleast some progress into this virtually unexplored territory.
Finally, the model appears to have some policy relevance. For it pro-
vides some theoretical justification for the commonly made argument that trade
in manufactured goods poses less of a problem ifit takesplace between devel-
oped countries than if it takesplacebetween developed and less—developed
countries.What this suggests is that it may have been economic forces as
much as political wisdom which made possible the great postwar liberalization
of trade among the industrial countries. These same economic forces are now,







whereAis the shadow price on the budget constraint,i.e.,the marginal
utilityof income.
If there are many products, however,thefirmproducinga particular
product can take the denominators of these expressions as given. Thus each
individual's dPmand for a particular product, and therefore also marketdemand,
will have elasticity 1/1—0.
ppendix: Elasticity of DemandforIndividual Products
The analysis in Section 1 depends on the result that the elasticity of
demandforany particular product is 1/1—8. This appendix gives a demonstra-
tion of this.
Consider an individual maximizing hisutilityfunction (1) subject to
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